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Abstract—The Internet of Things (IoT) is an extension of the
traditional Internet, which allows a very large number of smart
devices, such as home appliances, network cameras, sensors and
controllers to connect to one another to share information and
improve user experiences. IoT devices are micro-computers for
domain-specific computations rather than traditional function-
specific embedded devices. This opens the possibility of seeing
many kinds of existing attacks, traditionally targeted at the
Internet, also directed at IoT devices. As shown by recent
events, such as the Mirai and Brickerbot botnets, DDoS attacks
have become very common in IoT environments as these lack
basic security monitoring and protection mechanisms. In this
paper, we propose a novel light-weight approach for detecting
DDos malware in IoT environments. We extract the malware
images (i.e., a one-channel gray-scale image converted from a
malware binary) and utilize a light-weight convolutional neural
network for classifying their families. The experimental results
show that the proposed system can achieve 94.0% accuracy for
the classification of goodware and DDoS malware, and 81.8%
accuracy for the classification of goodware and two main malware
families.
Index Terms—IoT cyber-security, Malware image classifica-
tion, Convolutional Neural Network
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays the notion of the “Internet” has extended from
the connection between personal computers to networks to
a much larger range of devices. Traditional micro devices,
such as many kinds of sensors and controllers, are typically
only able to perform domain-specific tasks based on pre-
defined rules. By substituting these function-specific devices
with CPU-controlled ones and connection-enabled micro-
computers, these “things” become smarter due to the stronger
computational capability and the information sharing through
the interconnection among them via the Internet. Therefore,
these things can deal with much more complicated tasks than
before and by enabling Cloud services users can easily receive
data reported by the things and control them.
Despite these advantages, becoming smarter means also
becoming more vulnerable, with more chances for potential
adversaries to threaten these things. Yet general IoT systems
are still far from being properly secured due to the difficulty
of creating unified standards for the various types of IoT
hardware and software platforms. In addition, even if smarter
compared with current personal computers, IoT devices still
lack of sufficient computational resources to be able to use ex-
isting PC security solutions. However, Cloud services provide
a way for developing security protection for IoT devices, e.g.,
for malware detection [18], [19].
In this paper, we consider a solution to protect the local IoT
devices from being abused for DDoS attacks based on botnets
of IoT devices, which is currently a common attack method
against IoT networks. To accomplish this, we first classify
the IoT DDoS malware samples recently collected in the
wild on two major families, namely Mirai and Linux.Gafgyt.
We then propose a lightweight solution for detecting and
classifying IoT DDoS malware and benign application locally
on the IoT devices by converting the program binaries to
gray-scale images, and by feeding these images to a small
size convolutional neural network for detecting malware. In
this way, resource-constrained IoT devices can afford the
computation needed for running the proposed detection system
locally. Experimental results show that the proposed system
can achieve 94.0% accuracy for classifying goodware and
DDoS malware, and 81.8% accuracy for the classification of
goodware and two main malware families.
The main contributions of this research are the following
ones:
• this is the first classification system tested on real IoT
malware samples - previous works have used regular or
mobile malware samples instead, due to the difficulty in
obtaining IoT malware samples [2], [11], [13]. Specifi-
cally, there is currently no publicly available IoT malware
dataset and the first IoT honeypot for collecting samples
of IoT threats was released relatively recently [1];
• the proposed IoT malware classification system can be
deployed on real IoT devices. We show in detail the feasi-
bility of using lightweight image classifier for recognizing
IoT malware through malware images. Malware image
classification has been proposed for classifying regular
malware [4]; however, IoT malware is functionally differ-
ent. For example, many IoT malware may try to kill other
malware to guarantee enough computational resource for
themselves;
• according to the experimental results, we prove that the
proposed system can reliably classify goodware and IoT
DDoS malware;
• to the best of our knowledge, there is currently no
reference to describe the time complexity of convolu-
tional neural networks (CNNs). However, the proposed
CNN-based approach is empirically considered to be
lightweight since it does not need to maintain any training
data for classification, which is unlike several other types
of common classifiers for malware classification such
as Support Vector Machine and K nearest neighbours.
The computation of CNN for classification is rather
simple which only involves summation and activation.
In addition, the proposed system is based on a two
layer shallow network which is much more efficient than
common deep learning models.
The paper is structured as follows. In Sect. II we discuss
related work. Sect. III explains procedures for extracting
IoT DDoS malware images and implementing a small size
convolutional neural network for classification. In Sect. IV
the detection results in two different scenarios are listed and
in Sect. 5 the limitation of the proposed method is discussed.
In Sect. VI the achievement of this research is summarized
and future work is discussed.
II. RELATED WORKS
Even if IoT security is an important topic, few defensive
solutions exist in the literature [12]. Only recently, the first
honeypot specifically for collecting IoT malware has been
established by Pa et al. [1]. Their honeypot systems simulated
8 different CPU architectures and are built for observing
attacks coming through the Telnet protocol. Initially they
collected 43 distinct malware samples which are mostly DDoS
attack malware. Their results show that the DDoS attack
is the most common security threat in current IoT network
environments. These authors kindly shared their observed data
set with us which we have used in this research for evaluating
our proposal.
To the best of our knowledge, while most other works
focus on Android malware detection [24], [25], the “Cloudeye”
[2] is in practice the only current work specific for IoT
malware detection. The system is a signature matching-based
malware detection solution. IoT clients are only responsible
for preliminary scanning the software locally, and then sending
hashed abstracts of suspicious files to Cloud servers for deep
analysis, therefore guaranteeing data privacy and low-cost
communications. However, in IoT environments the inherent
weakness of signature matching-based detection still exists:
for example, the proposed system is not able to deal with new
variants of existing samples.
Apart from signature matching, machine learning-based
malware detection has been proved as effective in various
scenarios [3], [14]–[16], [22], [23]. In IoT environments,
machine learning methods are expected to be suitable too
because of the availability of Cloud services. In fact, in a
possible scenario, the training can be performed on Cloud
server, while resource-constrained IoT devices can receive
the trained classifiers from the servers and run the algorithm
locally. In fact, several machine learning classifiers are heavy
at training but efficient during test phase.
Classifying malware images has been proved as an effective
way for recognizing common PC malware [9], [26]. It is essen-
tially a method for comparing two malware binaries. Nataraj et
al. first utilize malware images for classifying regular Internet
malware with k-nearest neighbors [4]. However, the system
requires pre-processing of filtering to extract the image texture
as features for classification, which might not fit the resource-
constrained IoT environments. Similaly, the artificial neural
network (ANN) malware classification proposed by Makandar
[28] might also be hard for IoT devices to handle since the
heavy computational cost of multiple fully connected layers
in ANN for classification. Yue utilized convolutional neural
network for malware family classification [5]. In this research,
we use malware images for IoT malware classification and
show it is a feasible approach.
III. METHODOLOGY
In this Section, we describe the methodology of feeding
malware images as features to a small two-layer convolutional
neural network for detection.
A. Lightweight IoT DDoS Malware Filter
For the scenario of detecting IoT DDoS malware detection
locally, as previously pointed out, the main difficulty of
deploying malware filters lies in the fact that the computational
resources available on IoT devices is limited. A direct solution
under such a condition is relying on the security protection
services provided by powerful remote servers such as IoT
Cloud servers. These servers are usually well guarded such
that a central node failure (e.g., taken down by attacks)
rarely occurs. Another advantage is that the threat databases
maintained on these servers are much more comprehensive
and can be updated more rapidly than on IoT devices. For
these reasons, in our proposed system, firstly a lightweight
malware classification system can be responsible for recog-
nizing suspicious programs and behaviors locally. Note that at
this stage, the main goal is to provide a score whether a file
might be suspicious or not, i.e. it needs further analysis. In
such a case, the system delivers the files or the corresponding
abstracts to a remote Cloud server for deeper analysis. The
Cloud side can update and distribute new trained detectors to
the clients periodically. In the following, we discuss the local
malware filter on the client side. We assume that a set of Cloud
servers are able to analyze malware samples and retrain the
classifiers using standard machine learning algorithms. The
proposal system structure is shown in Fig.1.
Fig. 1. The light-weight malware detection scheme proposed.
B. IoT DDoS Malware Families
According to the recent observation and preliminary anal-
ysis [1], the IoT DDoS malware are functionally similar
to existing DDoS malware on PC platforms. However, IoT
DDoS malware also contain some new features that are rarely
observed before. For example, some samples try to kill other
samples of competitive families to get more system resources
for themselves, due to the limited computational capability of
IoT devices. In addition, IoT malware often targets a specific
class of devices, such as Internet cameras, DVR and so on.
Finally, IoT malware can be also compatible with different
processor architectures, ensuring the maximum possible suc-
cessful infections.
C. Malware Image Classification
An interesting and novel way of conducting malware classi-
fication is to analyze malware images. In particular, a malware
binary can be reformatted as an 8-bit sequence and then be
converted to a gray-scale image which has one channel and
pixel values from 0 to 255 [4]. The resulting image can then
be fed into machine learning image classifiers for classifica-
tion. Many machine learning classifiers are essentially much
more efficient than signature-matching systems, which is the
most common used malware detection method. In a matching
signatures system, the signature database is typically large
in size as it has to contain information for each malware
sample and all of its possible variants. In the case of machine
learning, little information has to be kept for classification.
For example, k-means clustering needs only the information
of centroids and radii for classification once trained. Support
vector machine merely keeps a small set of training data (i.e.,
the support vectors) in the test phase. In addition, machine
learning methods overcome signature matching on detecting
zero-day attacks. Even if machine learning based methods can
have higher false-positives, however, in our case of building
preliminary malware filter, the false-positives can be less ex-
pensive than false-negatives since the latter will make the IoT
device exposure to maliciousness directly. Converting malware
binaries to the corresponding images only requires to obtaining
the input vectors of the convolutional neural network, i.e., 8-bit
vectors. Such convention is straight-forwards that requires only
re-organize the binaries but no further pre-processing (i.e., the
real image is even not necessary but only the corresponding
vector that represents the image is needed as input).
D. Neural Network for Malware Detection
Convolutional neural networks have been proved to have
better performance for image recognition than many other
kinds of classifiers. A convolutional neural network has two
important characteristics that make it fit the scenario of pre-
liminary filtering malware on local IoT devices:
• automatic feature extraction: many previous works
have focused on extracting effective features for malware
detection. However, most of them are only effective under
specific scenarios, and this might lead to poor scalability.
Neural network can automatically extract higher level
features from the input raw features. That is, the network
can learn deep non-linear features that can be hardly
discovered and understood by human-beings. These are
sometimes actually counter-intuitive, but indeed effective.
• test phase efficiency: the training progress of a con-
volutional neural network requires heavy computation
and, for instance, high-end graphic cards are necessary
for accelerating training large networks. However, once
trained, the network itself is rather lightweight and can
be run with tiny computational resources, since only
the trained parameters and information of network struc-
ture are kept [29], [30]. In contrast, another supervised
lightweight classifier, the one-class support vector ma-
chine (OCSVM), though simpler than normal two-class
SVM, still needs to keep a certain amount of training data
when running the classification, while a convolutional
neural network does not need to keep any. In practice,
the training can be handled by the Cloud servers and
only the trained network is sent to IoT nodes. On the
local IoT side, the convolutional neural network can be
run for detecting malware images.
IV. EXPERIMENT AND RESULTS
A. Preparing the Dataset
In this Section we evaluate the efficacy and efficiency of
the proposed method on an IoT malware dataset collected
by IoTPOT [1], the first honeypot for collecting IoT threat
samples. The malware samples are labelled using VirusTotal
[8] with the majority rule. The dataset originally contains 500
malware samples, where most of them are classified into four
big families: Linux.Gafgyt.1, Linux.Gafgyt (other variants of
Linux.Gafgyt family except Linux.Gafgyt.1), Mirai [10] and
Trojan.Linux.Fgt. The rest of the samples belong to relatively
rare families such as Tsunami, Hajime, LightAidra. Then we
re-organize the samples into two big categories: Mirai family,
which contains Mirai and Trojan.Linux.Fgt, and Linux.Gafgyt
family which contains Linux.Gafgyt.1 and other variants. In
particular, Mirai has been shown to have similar features to
Trojan.Linux.Fgt [17].
On the other side, the benign binary samples are collected
from Ubuntu 16.04.3 system files. The number of samples are
balanced for each family by randomly removing the samples
that belong to classes that are too big. After the preprocessing
phase, we analyzed 365 samples where each class has the same
Fig. 2. Images of Goodware
Fig. 3. Malware Image Examples of the Linux.Gafgyt Family. Note that these
are the raw malware images (the same below) whose size will be unified for
putting in CNN.
number of samples. Among them, we utilize 45 samples (each
class has 15 samples) for testing, and the rest for training.
According to the discussion above, the system proposed is
only responsible for preliminary detection. That is, the goal is
to identify whether a sample is benign or belongs to one of
the big malware families: Mirai and Linux.Gafgyt, but there
is no need to understand exactly which kind of variant it is.
B. Obtaining the Malware Images
Once the raw data-set is ready, we convert each sample to
the corresponding malware gray-scale image by following the
same procedures implemented in [4]. In particular, a malware
binary can be reformatted to a sequence whose elements are
8-bit strings. Then each string can be converted to a decimal
number which can be seen as the value of a one-channel pixel,
which is in the range between 0 and 255. Therefore the entire
sequence represents a gray-scale image. We rescale the images
to the size of 64x64 such that they can be used as input to
a convolutional neural network. Some examples of malware
and benign-ware images are shown by Fig. 2, 3 and 4. By
comparison, the structural difference between malware and
goodware images can be identified. For example, it can be
seen that malware images always are more dense. In particular,
the majority of the Mirai malware images have a dense central
code payload. On the other hand, the image of goodwares tend
to have larger header parts than malwares.
Fig. 4. Malware Image examples of the Mirai Family
convolution layer(kernel=3, stride=1, depth=32)
max pooling layer(kernel=2, stride=2)
convolution layer(kernel=3, stride = 1, depth=72)
max pooling layer(kernel=2, stride=2)
fully connected layer(size=256)
softmax classifier
TABLE I
STRUCTURE OF THE IMPLEMENTED CNN.
C. Convolutional Neural Network Configuration
To be lightweight, we have implemented a small, two layer
shallow convolutional neural network, compared with common
image recognition models, such as ImageNet [20] and VGG
[7]. The network structure is shown in Table. I. The network
is trained with 5000 iterations with a training batch size of 32
and learning rate 0.0001.
D. Results
The classification results are shown in Tables III and
II for the cases of two (benign and malicious) and three-
class (benign and two malware families: Mirai and gafgyt)
classification. We have performed a 5-fold hold-out validation,
namely the experiments were conducted five times which each
time with a completely different training/test data combination
(i.e., there are no shared test samples between any two of five
test data sets).
According to the results of two-class classification, we find
the proposed system can predict the existence of maliciousness
with about 94.0% accuracy on the average. The accuracy of
three-class classification is relatively lower. Specifically, there
are 6.67% malicious samples are misclassified as benign which
XXXXXXXTrue
Predict Benign Gafgyt Mirai
Benign 94.67% 2.67% 2.67%
Gafgyt 6.67% 72.00% 21.33%
Mirai 0% 21.33% 78.67%
TABLE II
CONFUSION MATRIX FOR 3-CLASS CLASSIFICATION
XXXXXXXTrue
Predict Benign Malicious
Benign 94.67% 5.33%
Malicious 6.67% 93.33%
TABLE III
CONFUSION MATRIX FOR 2-CLASS CLASSIFICATION
all belong to Gafgyt family while there is no misclassification
of Mirai family to benign. This indicates the Gafgyt has
more similar binaries to benign goodware. On the other side,
the probability of misclassifying a Mirai sample to Gafgyt
class is the same as probability of misclassifying the latter
to the former. Generally, the difference between benign and
malicious samples is more recognizable than the difference
between two malware families. Comparing with misclassi-
fication between benign and malicious samples (i.e., two-
class classification), the system is more likely to misclassify
the samples of two malware families in the case of three-
class classification. This indicates the similarity between these
two families. Specifically, samples of two families might be
obfuscated in similar ways, or/and share a part of the malicious
functions. In fact, the basic botnet functions of different DDoS
malware are similar, and mainly include receiving instructions
from the control server and spreading the infection. Similar to
the local malware filter proposed in this paper, the IoT malware
itself also has to be lightweight such that their functions
have to be relatively direct and simple since there is little
space to add more complex functions according to the limited
computational resources.
Our accuracy results compete with similar previous works
[3], [5]. In specific, Yue [5] also utilized convolutional neural
networks and malware images for classifying several PC
malware families. However the results are carried out by using
much bigger and complex network structures (i.e. Very deep
networks (VGG) which contain more than 10 layers while ours
only has two layers). Similarly, a very complex preprocess
procedure is needed in [5] which involves initial feature
selection and random projection while our proposal directly
uses raw features for classification. According to the accuracy
results, the proposed system can be utilized as a regular
malware detector, or a first-layer malware classifier. That is,
it can conduct a precise classification to identify benign and
maliciousness but may misclassify the exact identity of a
specific malware sample, which needs the aid of Cloud to
conduct precise classification. A comparison of corresponding
experimental accuracy and settings is shown by Table.4.
V. LIMITATION
Despite the advantages of being fast and lightweight, the
proposed detection method is vulnerable to complex code
obfuscation that entirely changes the structure of a binary –
this issue is common in image-based detectors [31]–[33]. The
problem can be partially mitigated by using more complex
static features, such as OpCode sequences and API calls [34],
even though obfuscation on these features is also possible.
However, the usage of obfuscation techniques on IoT mal-
ware is not widespread nowadays, therefore it is difficult to
evaluate whether in the near future IoT malware will be obfus-
cated using similar techniques used in traditional malware, also
considering how the limited computational resources of IoT
devices influences the implementation of obfuscation methods.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have proposed a lightweight malware image
classification scheme for detecting IoT DDoS malware on
local IoT devices, and shown its effectivess. The malware
detector is based on convolutional neural networks and can
be tuned to be more efficient by using various techniques of
reducing network size. For example, removing the neurons
and links that are not critical in the network can reduce the
number of parameters needed for classification [21]. Such
further improvements can make the proposed system imple-
mentable on IoT devices with even less computation resources.
In addition, new malware image extraction methods can be
proposed to obtain more representative features of malware
for classification.
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